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ENFORCEMENT OF PHILADELPHIA'S 1969 AIR
MANAGEMENT CODE: THE FIRST
THREE YEARS
JAMES D. KEENEYt

M ORE

THAN a hundred spectators in the Philadelphia City
Council chambers cheered on October 10, 1969, as the Council
unanimously adopted a new Air Management Code1 for the City. In
typical political phraseology, but also with considerable foundation, the
new Code was described as "the toughest air control bill in the nation."2
A forerunner of similar codes in Illinois,' New York,' and elsewhere, the new Code adopted in Philadelphia gave sweeping new
powers to the City's already existing Air Pollution Control Board
(APCB).' Overall, the Code's provisions were not very different
.t Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. A.B., Harvard College, 1966; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1972.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to the Keystone Foundation of
Philadelphia- without whose generous support the present study would not have
been possible.
1. PHILADELPHIA, PA., Am MANAGEMENT CODE (1969) [hereinafter cited as

Am

MANAGEMENT CODE].

2. Phila. Inquirer,

Oct. 10, 1969, at 33, col.

5

(statement

attributed

to

Pennsylvania's Democratic majority whip Bellis and Republican floor leader
Foglietta).
3. ILL. REV. STAT, ch. Ill-A, §§ 1008-10 (Supp. 1972).
4. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATIoN LAW

§§

101-711

(McKinney 1972).

5. The Philadelphia Air Pollution Control Board (APCB) was created by
an ordinance first adopted June 25, 1948, subsequently incorporated in PHILADELPHIA,
PA., HOME
CHARTER].

RULE. CHARTER § 3-902

(1948)

[hereinafter cited as HOME RULE

APCB is composed of seven appointed members and the Commissioner
of Health. Of the appointed members, one must be an experienced business
executive, and two must be resident householders. The other four must include:
One from each of the following fields of activity, where he shall have had at
least five years' active experience: the operation of. plants containing high
pressure boilers; the management or operation of the business of mining or
manufacturing of solid, liquid, or gaseous fuels, involving the theory and practice
of fuel technology; the management or operation of transport facilities; and
the practice of designing or installing power and industrial equipment.
Id. For the relationship of the APCB to the Department of Health, see id. §§ 5-300
to 5-302. Section 5-300 sets out the general duties and functions of the Department
of Health, including:
(a) Protection of Public Health. It shall administer and enforce statutes,
ordinances, and regulations relating to public health including those dealing
with air, water, food and drugs, health hazards, the pursuit of occupations
affecting the public health, and pests....
Id. § 5-300 (second emphasis added). The. duties of the APCB are discussed in
section 5-302:
(It] shall advise the Department of Public Health and the Board of Health
on all matters pertaining to the control of air pollution and shall make reason-

(173)
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from those which are now being required of states and cities throughout the nation by the United States Environmental Protection Agency.6
Thus the Philadelphia experience in enforcing its model Code over a
three-year period is of considerable interest.
I.

HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

The Philadelphia Air Management Code, signed by the Mayor on
October 20, 1969, was adopted only after heavy political pressure had
been applied in favor of its enactment by a citizens' lobby, by Pennsylvania's Air Pollution Commission (APC) and by the National Air
Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA). In 1954, the City
adopted an air pollution control ordinance,7 quite progressive for its
time, which led to a substantial reduction of smoke and soot in the
years following its adoption.' Eventually, however, the momentum
of this earlier effort was lost, and the Philadelphia effort stagnated. 9
The first public indication that the Philadelphia program had
slipped seriously came in 1966 when the APC warned that it would
refuse to recertify Philadelphia's air pollution control program unless
the City's antiquated particulate regulations were amended.'" This was
a serious threat to the City, since local air pollution control programs
were only allowed to operate in Pennsylvania so long as they were
certified as effectively enforcing standards at least as stringent as those
of the Commonwealth itself." The City's position regarding the particulate regulation was that an entirely new air code should be considered in preference to lesser, piecemeal revision of the 1954 legislation and that a broader approach to air pollution control should be
attempted. Accordingly, officials of Philadelphia and surrounding communities cooperated in order to secure a United States Public Health
Service grant to study air pollution problems throughout the Delaware
Valley.' 2 One of the results of the fifteen-month, $277,000 study was
to increase the pressure on Philadelphia officials to take effective action
able regulations, not contrary to any statute or ordinance or to the regulations
of the Board of Health, controlling air pollution.
Id. § 5-302. As the Department of Public Health is presently organized, its air
pollution control duties are performed entirely by the Bureau of Air Management

Services (AMS).
6. 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.1 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
7. PHILADELPHL ,, PA., CODE §§ 3-101 et seq. (1954).
8. Interview with Dr. P. Walton Purdom, Director of Environmental Engineering, Drexel University (former Philadelphia Commissioner of Health), in Philadelphia, July 9, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Purdom Interview].
9. Sunday Bulletin (Phila.), June 29, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
10. Interview with Victor H. Sussman, Chairman, Pennsylvania Air Pollution
Commission, in Harrisburg, Aug. 10, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Sussman Interview].

11. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4012 (Supp. 1972), as amended, Act No. 245 (Oct. 26,

1972).
12. Sussman Interview, supra note 10.
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in the area of air pollution control. The findings of the study, released
late in 1967, showed Philadelphia to be overwhelmingly the worst
source of air pollution in the region, belching far more noxious gases,
fumes, and smoke into the air of neighboring communities than it received from them, and that, if only it would undertake a serious antipollution campaign, air quality throughout the region would be greatly
improved."3
At the same time, NAPCA officials were prodding local Philadelphia authorities to act quickly on their own initiative and thereby
avoid the embarrassment of having a federal air pollution control
conference called under the provisions of the Clean Air Act of 1965' a distinct possibility, since federal officials had criticized the region as
"almost devoid of any local leadership, political or otherwise, that
shows real promise of cleaning up the air in a reasonable time."' 5
Then Republican mayoralty candidate, now District Attorney, Arlen
Specter, characterized the Air Pollution Control Section of the Philadelphia Department of Health as being "almost in the basement of
the municipal bureaucracy.""
In April 1968, the APC gave the City final notice that its air
pollution control program would be decertified if new particulate regulations were not promulgated immediately. 17 When the City's APCB
failed to respond to this eleventh-hour call to action, the Commonwealth's APC formally re-assumed jurisdiction over the City's air
pollution control program.' 8
Thus the City administration was under strong pressure from
state and federal governments, surrounding communities, and opposition politicians to take dramatic steps to reverse the clearly deteriorating situation. Finally succumbing to this pressure in the summer of
1968, the City contracted with Dr. P. Walton Purdom, a recognized
air pollution control expert, to draft a new and comprehensive Air
Management Code.'" Purdom's draft was approved by the Philadelphia APCB in October 1968, and by the City's Law Department
13. REGIONAL CONFERENCE or ELECTED OFFICIALS, FINAL REPORT ON METEOROLOGY AND AIR POLLUTION IN THE DELAWARE VALLEY 8 (1968) (U.S. Pub. Health
Serv. Grant No. 66A-5604Z).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970).
15. Evening Bulletin (Phila.), June 26, 1967, at 10, col. 2.
16. A. Specter, Air Pollution in Philadelphia 25 (1967) (mimeograph on file
in office of former Philadelphia City Councilman, David Cohen, 1420 Walnut Street,
Phila., Pa.). The bureaucratic structure, according to Specter, was: (1) Mayor;
(2) Commissioner of Public Health; (3) Deputy Commissioner for Community
Health Services; (4) Director of the Division of Environmental Health; and (5)
Acting Chief of the Air Pollution Control Section.
17. Sussman Interview, supra note 10.
18. Id.
19. Purdom Interview, supra note 8.
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in March 1969.20 In July, the City Council's Health and Welfare
Committee held hearings on the draft Code, 21 and in October the Air
Management Code was finally adopted.2 2
We have described Philadelphia's reluctance to deal with its air
pollution problems and the impact of state and federal pressure in some
detail to draw an analogy between this relatively typical, large American city which adopted a surprisingly tough air pollution control code,
almost despite itself, and the many states which are now being forced
to enact similar codes in the context of similar incentives and much
stronger federal pressures made possible by the Clean Air amendments
of 1970.23 It is the major purpose of this Article to provide some
practical introduction to the problems and potentials of codes enacted
in such circumstances.
II.

THE CODE'S PROVISIONS

The Air Pollution Control Board was given broad power under
the new Code to establish ambient air quality objectives and to promulgate regulations limiting the discharge of airborne pollutants.24
It was empowered to establish air quality objectives for designated
areas of the City, and to enforce them by promulgating its own land
use restrictions (even preventing usages otherwise allowed by the zoning board), by banning some types of enterprise from the City entirely,
and by restricting motor vehicle traffic in certain areas. 25 Most prop-

erly, the scope of this authority was given broad interpretation by the
APCB, as evidenced in its first ten-year plan for air management. 6
The plan set forth an impressive list of regulations, either already
adopted or planned for adoption under Code authority. These included
emission standards for particulates, 27 sulfur dioxide, 28 asbestos, 29 toxic
20. Id.

21. Id.
22. AIR

MANAGEMENT CODE at 1.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (Supp.

V, 1969).
24.

AIR MANAGEMENT CODE

§ 3-302.

25. Id. The Board was also required to adopt, within one year,

a ten-year air
resources management plan, to revise it every two years thereafter, to hold general
public hearings once a year, and to classify sources of air pollution as a basis for
promulgating its emission control regulations. Id.
26. City of Philadelphia, Dep't of Public Health, Bureau of Air Management
Services, Ten Year Plan for Air Management, October 20, 1970 [hereinafter cited

as Ten Year Plan].
27. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg.
II, §§ IV-VII & IX, Apr. 10, 1970.
28. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg.
III, Apr. 10, 1970.
29. No regulation was adopted until July 1971, but spraying of asbestos had
nevertheless been prohibited. See notes 76-95 and accompanying text in!ra.
[Presently, n]o spray material containing asbestos as a component part: shall
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and radioactive contaminants, 80 hydrocarbons, 8' carbon monoxide,2
odor,3 3 and photochemically reactive oxidants,"4 plus an incinerator
regulation, 5 a licensing scheme, 6 an air pollution emergency procedure,"7 and a schedule for dealing with the important problem of
transportation."
The new Code also endowed the Department of Public Health's
Bureau of Air Management Services (AMS) with a number of new
tools8 9 commensurate with its increased enforcement responsibilities.
The enforcement tools included new powers of inspection,4 0 increased
penalties, 41 authority to issue administrative orders, 42 and power to
block the issuance or secure the revocation of certain construction perinits issued by the Department of Licenses and Inspection (L&I). 48 The
Code also empowered AMS to control L&I's issuance and revocation of
operating licenses for equipment creating air pollution," and to secure
the sealing of such equipment upon permit or license revocation. 45 Most

importantly, any continuing violation of the Code, or regulations issued
under it, was declared to constitute a "nuisance per se," and AMS was
be applied in building construction, reconstruction or alteration within the City
of Philadelphia.
City. of Philadelphia, Dep't of Public Health, Regulation to Control Asbestos in
Construction, Occupied Buildings, and Places of Employment, June 16, 1971.
30. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg.
II, §31.III,City
Apr.of10,Philadelphia,
1970.
Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg.
V, June 8, 1971.
32. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg.
VIII, June 13, 1972.
33. A proposed Air Management Reg. VI, dealing with odors, was considered
and rejected by the APCB in June 1972. Interview with Robert W. King, Assistant
Director, AMS Compliance & Enforcement Division, in Philadelphia, Nov. 13, 1972
[hereinafter cited as 1972 King Interview].
34. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg.
VII, Apr. 11, 1972.
35. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Regulation Relating to
Control of Incinerators, Apr. 8, 1969.
36. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Regs.
I & II, Apr. 10, 1970.
37. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg.
IV, Oct. 20, 1970.
38. The plan called for studies, to be completed by July 1971, "documenting
the magnitude of the air pollution problem from transportation sources .... ." Ten
Year Plan, supra note 26, at 12. One year later, evaluation of the study data was
to be completed, and by July 1973, appropriate regulations were to be adopted.
By 1975 the planners euphorically predicted that "automotive pollution will be
reduced to acceptable levels." Id.
39. AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-301. The Code actually delegates enforcement piwers to the Department of Public Health; for simplicity, we shall refer to
the delegation as if it had been made directly to AMS.
40. Id. § 3-301 (6). Polluters were required to conduct tests at their own
expense to determine whether they were in compliance with the Code. Id.
§ 3-301(11).
41. Id.§ 3-103(5).
42. Id. § 3-305.
43. Id.§ 3-303.
44. Id. §§ 3-303(1) (c)-(e). But see id. § 3-306(2) (c) (.1).
45. Id.§ 3-103(1).
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authorized to seek injunctive relief against such a violation without
having to prove the existence of any harmful effects on the public."
Additionally, AMS was given authority to approve or reject proposed schedules for delayed compliance with particular regulations.4 7
The Bureau of Air Management Services was also directed to establish a City-wide network of monitoring stations4 and to publicize
information regarding the quality of the City's air.49 Further, AMS
was given the power to declare air pollution warnings, alerts, and
emergencies, 50 and was specifically required to conduct research on air
pollution, 5 ' institute training programs for air pollution control equipment operators,5 2 and to investigate all complaints of air pollution
received from the public. 8
III.

THE FIRST THREE YEARS: THE ENFORCEMENT
TOOLS IN OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

In the first three years of its existence, the 1969 Code has proven

to be generally well conceived. The principal enforcement problems
have resulted from limitations imposed by state law, the Philadelphia
Home Rule Charter, and a failure to insure that the Philadelphia Police
Department would assume responsibility for inspection of motor vehicle
exhausts. Nevertheless, each of the Code's new enforcement tools,
either alone or in combination with others, has proven valuable in
controlling particular sources of air pollution. This Article will now
focus on the importance of matching particular remedies with particular types of violations.
A.

Sulfur Content of Fuels

An exception to the Code's general enabling philosophy is a specific
statutory provision directly requiring a three-step reduction in the sulfur
content of fuel oil. 4 Powers of inspection and the credible threat of
substantial penalties have made enforcement of the sulfur provision
relatively easy. Hundreds of samples have been taken from the storage
46. Id. § 3-103 (2).
47. Id. § 3-301(17).
48. Id. § 3-301(5).
49. Id. § 3-301(21).

50. Id.§ 3-301(15).
51. Id. § 3-301(18).

52. Id. § 3-301(19).

53. Id. § 3-301(4).
54. Id. § 3-207. The first stage of reduction, effective May 1, 1970, has
apparently resulted in a 40 per cent decrease in sulfur dioxide emissions within
the city. 20 AIR POLL. CONTROL Ass'N J. 698 (1970). The average sulfur content
of heavy residual fuels has been reduced, from approximately 1.5 to 2.0 per cent

in 1966, to a current maximum of 1.0 per cent. Letter from Edward F. Wilson,
Assistant Commissioner of Public Health for AMS, to the author, July 13, 1971
[hereinafter cited as Wilson Letter]. See note 59 infra.
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tanks and tank trucks of refineries, suppliers, and fuel users in the
City. 5 Such sampling is easy, inexpensive, and yields virtually irrefutable evidence when analyzed.56 Moreover, the Code's penalty provisions are also well adapted to this method of enforcement. Once the
discovery of a single supplier or consumer violation has been traced
to the original source and then to each supplier and consumer, fines
can be levied against all parties. In the case of multiple violations, the
total amounts can be quite substantial, since each sale, delivery, or day
of use constitutes a separate violation, and each violation can result
in a $300 fine or imprisonment for 90 days."
On April 10, 1970, the APCB strengthened the Code's sulfur
control provision by adopting a regulation limiting the sulfur content
of bituminous and anthracite coal.58 The first two stages of reduction
pursuant to this regulation59 presented few enforcement problems.
Since the regulation makes mere delivery for use in Philadelphia a
punishable offense,6" AMS was able to concentrate enforcement efforts
at the source - railroads and ocean freight lines were contacted, informed of the new regulation, and inspected to insure their compliance."' Since coal can be easily sampled and analyzed, enforcement
has been as easy as enforcement of the fuel oil controls.6 2
For these first two stages, then, the regulatory problems have been
similar for coal and oil. The third stage of coal regulation, originally
scheduled to become effective October 1, 1972, but later postponed in
part until October 1, 1975, is expected to pose a more difficult enforcement problem. Presently, the sulfur content of both anthracite and
bituminous coal must not exceed 0.3 per cent by weight. 6 Since no
55. Wilson Letter, supra note 54.
56. Interview with Norman Childs, Executive Director, Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, in Philadelphia, July 6, 1971 [hereinafter cited as
Childs Interview].
57. AI MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-207(1)(a) provides that "[n]o fuel merchant
shall . . . sell . . . for use in Philadelphia, and no person shall use commercial

fuel oils which contain sulfur in excess of the percentages by weight set forth in
[an accompanying] table." Section 3-103(5) provides penalties for violation of
the Code's provisions, and violation of any requirement is considered a separate
violation for each day the violation continues. Id. § 3-103(5)(d).
58. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg.
III, § III(A) (2), Apr. 10, 1970, as amended, July 18, 1972.
59. On May 1, 1970, the allowable sulfur content of bituminous coal was
reduced to 2.0 per cent by weight, and that of anthracite to 0.7 per cent. Id. After
July 1, 1971, bituminous coal was not allowed to contain more than 1 per cent
sulfur by weight. Id. Levels were further reduced on Oct. 1, 1972. Neither anthracite nor bituminous coal may now contain more than 0.3 per cent sulfur by
weight. Id.
60. Id. § III(A).
61. Interview with Robert W. King, Assistant Director, AMS Compliance &
Enforcement Division, in Philadelphia, July 18, 1971 [hereinafter cited as 1971 King
Interview].
62. Id.
63. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg.
III, § III(A) (2), Apr. 10, 1970, as amended, July 18, 1972.
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the third stage

of sulfur reduction will have the practical effect of eliminating the sale
of coal in Philadelphia.6 5 At least some of the estimated 30,000 present
residential coal users are expected to react to this personal crisis by
using private vehicles to import coal from neighboring jurisdictions
where no such ban will be in effect. 6 Thus, effective enforcement will
require AMS to canvass the city, block-by-block, in search of the remaining coal users and to seal their coal-burning equipment.6 7 The
powers Of investigation, 6 8 summary prosecution, 69 and sealing of equip71
ment 7° appear to be ideally suited to this enforcement task.
B.

Asbestos Fireproofing

In this second context, inspection and the Code's summary penalties have proven almost totally useless; however, power to prevent the
issuance of general construction permits 72 has proven to be a very

effective enforcement tool.
64. APC MONITOR 3 (May 1971). The APC Monitor is a monthly AMS
report to the APCB.
65. Id.
66. 1971 King Interview, supra note 61.
67. Id. The Philadelphia Gas Works lists 175,000 domestic non-gas users in
the City. Although the gas company has no means of separating oil and electricity
users from coal users, it has provided AMS with a list of 30,000 addresses in areas
of the City where coal is believed to be the predominant fuel. AMS believes that
the majority of coal users are included in this group and, therefore, intends to
concentrate its enforcement efforts on these addresses. See APC MONITOR 3 (May
1971).
68. AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-301(4).
69. Id. § 3-301(3).
70. Id. § 3-103(1).
71. This entire scenario illustrates an important limitation on the delegation of
power to apolitical bodies to adopt air pollution regulations. Whatever its intentions,
the APCB has no means for alleviating the hardship which its coal regulations will
impose on many of the City's poorer residents who heat their modest homes with coal.
Unlike a city council or legislature, the APCB has no power to create a loan
program, grant conversion subsidies, or even offer tax relief to home owners who
must make the costly switch from coal to gas or oil furnaces. It should be noted,
however, that the most recent amendments to the regulations postpone such hardship:
Anthracite Coal used for heating purposes at the time of adoption of this
Regulation in buildings used exclusively for dwelling purposes and containing
fewer than three (3)

dwelling units . . . shall not exceed 0.7 per cent by

weight after May 1, 1970, and 0.3 per cent by weight after October 1, 1975.
No new coal burning facilities shall be installed after the adoption of this regulation that do not comply with [the more strict requirement as of October 1,
1972, set forth above].
City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg. III,
§ III(A) (2) (c), Apr. 10, 1970, as amended, July 18, 1972.
72. AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-303. The Dep't of Licenses and Inspections
(L & I) is charged with the duty:
[r]o transmit to the Department of Public Health for its recommendation all
applications, plans, and specifications for the construction, reconstruction, conversion, or alteration of any installation, equipment, or appurtenances and any
equipment pertaining thereto that may produce air pollutions [sic] or an air
pollution nuisance ....
Id. § 3-303(1) (a). L & I also has the authority "to issue permits for applications
which have been approved by the Department of Health," id. § 3-303(1) (b), thus
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The extremely hazardous and toxic qualities of the familiar mineral, asbestos, have only recently become apparent. The mineral has
been identified as a carcinogen, the inhalation of which also correlates
positively with the incidence of virtually all respiratory diseases." In
October 1969, AMS learned that asbestos was commonly being sprayed
on high-rise construction sites by Philadelphia building contractors
with almost no concern for public or worker safety. 4 One particularly
dangerous operation involved the construction of a downtown skyscraper from which particles of asbestos fell like snow intermittently
for many months.7 5
On November 5, 1969, AMS ruled that use of an asbestos spraying machine required an air management permit. 76 By the spring of
1970, only one permit had been issued and it required total containment
clearly implying that no authority exists for L & I to issue permits for applications
that are not approved by AMS. This inference is strengthened by L & I's duty:
[T]o revoke permits and licenses upon certification by the Department of Health
that the installation or operation does not comply with the provisions of the
application, that [it] produces air pollution or emissions of air contaminants in
excess of the standards established by [the Code] and . . . regulations, that
orders for correction or abatement have not been effbcted, or that the installation
or operation does not comply with [the Code] and the regulations.
Id. § 3-303(1)(e).
73. See Brodeur, A Reporter At Large: The Magic Mineral, THE NEW YORKER
117 (Oct. 12, 1968). See also NATIONAL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PRELIMINARY AIR POLLUTION
SURVEY OF ASBESTOS: A LITERATURE REVIEW (Pub. No. APTD 69-27 1969) ; Selikoff,
Asbestos, 11(2) ENVIRONMENT 3 (1969).
74. Unless otherwise indicated, the primary source of information for this section
has been the prosecution files of AMS, which were on file with Levy Anderson,
the Philadelphia City Solicitor during the summer of 1971. Information has also been
gleaned irom numerous unpublished and unpaginated memoranda, reports, and papers.
75. AMS inspectors wrote violations against the contractors for the Central
Penn National Bank Building, 5 Penn Center, Philadelphia, on Sept. 8, 9, 16, 22
& 24, 1969. See note 74 supra.
76. This "ruling" was apparently never formally promulgated. Rather, AMS
personnel simply began to inform contractors that permits were required. The Code
offers some support for this "ruling:"
No person shall build, erect, install, alter, or replace any article, machine, equipment device, or other contrivance or appurtenances, the use of which may cause
the issuance of air contaminants or the use of which may eliminate, reduce or
control the issuance of air contaminants, until an air management permit has
been obtained for such installation and construction.
AIR MANAGEMENT COnE § 3-306(1) (a) (emphasis added).
More drastic action might have been taken. In particular, AMS might have
sought to enjoin the spraying on the basis that it violated the prohibition against "the
escape of air contaminants to the atmosphere . . . which result in or cause air
pollution ....
Id. § 3-201 (a) (3). The Code defines "air pollution" as:
The presence in the atmosphere of one or more air contaminants or combinations
thereof in such quantities and of such duration that they are or may tend to be
injurious to human, plant, or animal life, or property, or that interfere with
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property or the conduct of business or
other human activities.
Id. § 3-102(4).
An additional alternative strategy might have employed the regulation which
prohibits "discharge into the atmosphere [of] any toxic . . . air contaminant ....
"
City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg. II, § III,
Apr. 10, 1970.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 2
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 18: p. 173

of the asbestos on the construction premises, with no visible emissions
of the toxic mineral allowed.
However, such permit terms were
wholly unrealistic, and multiple violations occurred. The contractor,
the Venzie Corporation, repeatedly claimed that particular violations
were the result of uncontrollable factors, such as bad weather or employee carelessness, and clearly was not deterred by the threat of a
few $300 fines. Moreover, AMS did not think it appropriate to resort
to summary prosecution, since the fines were so clearly trivial in comparison to the grave and immediate hazard to public health and safety
posed by the continued spraying.7"
AMS turned instead, therefore, to its more powerful remedy
a suit for injunction. 9 In March 1970, a suit was filed against the
contractor, alleging violation of the terms of its asbestos spraying
permit.80 On April 2, the general contractor agreed to a stipulation,
approved by the court of common pleas, providing for particular housekeeping and containment procedures ;"' but as early as April 30, an
AMS inspector, who will remain anonymous, noted that the terms of
the stipulation were being violated. A number of additional violations
were observed throughout May and June, and AMS began to consider re-opening the case.
A drama-tic development occurred to radically alter the situation
when, on June 22, Philadelphia's District Attorney secured an indictment of the contractor on a criminal nuisance theory 2 and proceeded
to try the case personally at a preliminary hearing on July 18 All
work stopped on the construction site the day the indictment was
announced, and local newspapers gave the story front page headlines."4
However, the ultimate outcome was no more satisfactory than the
result of AMS' earlier enforcement efforts. On July 21, the defendant
-

77. See note 74 supra.

78. Id.
79. Ai MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-103(2) (b).
80. City v. Venzie Corp., No. 4158 (C.P. Phila., filed Mar. 20, 1970).

81. City v. Venzie Corp., No. 4158 (C.P. Phila., stipulation approved Apr. 2,

1970).

82. Under the common law crime of keeping or continuing a public nuisance,

express power was given to the courts to direct, upon conviction, the abatement of
the nuisance at the expense of the defendant. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4612 (1963). See
Commonwealth v. Venzie Corp. Nos. 2259-2261 (C.P. Phila., filed June 22, 1970).
83. At the hearing, police detectives testified to observations made June 18 and
19. A medical expert testified to observation of the same conditions on June 22 and
to the health hazard involved. Judge Dandridge of the Philadelphia Municipal Court
then ruled that a prima facie case existed and that the action should be brought
to trial. The firm's counsel waived a grand jury hearing in order to expedite
disposition of the case. This information is based on contemporaneous memoranda

of AMS personnel, since no official
84. See, e.g., Evening Bulletin
reaction to the District Attorney's
handling of the case which served
least mildly credible.

record of the proceedings was transcribed.
(Phila.), June 22, 1970, at 1, col. 3. The initial
intervention resulted primarily from his personal
to make the threat of criminal imprisonment at

But see Kovel, A Case for Civil Penalties: Air Pollution

Control, 46 J. URBAN L. 153 (1969).
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was allowed to plead nolo contendere to the criminal indictment, and
the court ordered the firm to pay a penalty of $750 and to abide by a
slightly altered version of the April 2 stipulation.85
The Venzie case was mooted shortly thereafter when construction
of the building was completed, but a second and similar case, City v.
Frank H. Wilson Co.,"6 arose at about the same time, involving the
spraying of asbestos, without a permit, at the construction site of the
Martin Luther King High School. Moving quickly, AMS requested
the Philadelphia Law Department to seek an ex parte preliminary
injunction to halt spraying operations at the new site. By August 10,
1970, a consent decree was obtained, requiring the contractor to apply
for a permit.8 7 When the contractor, nevertheless, continued to spray
asbestos, AMS petitioned the court to prohibit all asbestos spraying
and related operations because of violation of the August 10 decree.
The court, however, chose instead to appoint a Master to oversee
spraying operations.""
8 " to AMS;
This decision was not only a rebuff
it was a reversion
to the common law nuisance concept of balancing the rights of the
polluter against those of the public - an approach plainly inconsistent
with the Code's affirmation that "no one has any right to discharge
air contaminants to the atmosphere .

. . .""

Nevertheless, AMS did

not attempt to appeal the ruling, but instead vigorously reported violations of AMS permit conditions to the Master. 9' The Master, a medical doctor, had the power to halt construction operations entirely, but
never did so despite her finding that violations were indeed occurring.9 2
Instead, she concluded: that the decree's requirement of "100% containment" was unrealistic; that "if the building was to be completed
85. Additional conditions included a set of specific rules for housekeeping and
disposal, requiring, for example, that asbestos be vacuumed up immediately after each
application rather than merely when each floor was completed and that no worker be
permitted to leave for the day before all asbestos had been cleaned up. City v. Venzie
Corp., No. 4158 (C.P. Phila., filed July 21, 1970).
86. City v. Frank H. Wilson Co., No. 4476 (C.P. Phila., filed July 30, 1970).
87. City v. Frank H. Wilson Co., No. 4476 (C.P. Phila., order of Aug. 10,
1970).
88. City v. Frank H. Wilson Co., No. 4476 (C.P. Phila., order of Aug. 20,
1970). The Master was charged "to impose such requirements as might be necessary
to protect the health of workers and the public." Interview with Katherine M.
Sturgis, M.D., Master in City v. Frank H. Wilson Co., in Philadelphia, Dec. 31,
1971 [hereinafter cited as Sturgis Interview].
89. Adding insult to injury, the court ordered AMS to pay half the fee of the
court-appointed Master. City v. Frank H. Wilson Co., No. 4476 (C.P. Phila.,
order of Sept. 23, 1970).
90. AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-101 (1) (c).
91. Violations were found on Aug. 21, 24-28 & 31, and on Sept. 4, 8, 9, 25 & 28.
The Master was notified by William Reilly, Director, AMS Compliance & Enforcement Division, on Aug. 25, 27 & 31, Sept. 10, and Oct. 1, 1970. Sturgis Interview,
supra note 88.

92. Id.
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they would have to go ahead and spray;" and that the only practical
alternatives were to ignore the danger or else ban the use of asbestos
entirely - an action which she was unwilling to take.9" However, the
work was completed by October, thus making further proceedings moot.
With extraordinary ingenuity, AMS temporarily solved the problem of judicial refusal to enjoin asbestos spraying absolutely by the
simple maneuver of refusing to approve construction permit applications forwarded for approval or disapproval by the Department of
Licenses and Inspections, whenever the applicants proposed to spray
asbestos fireproofing.94 Whether this practice would have been upheld
on judicial review is unclear.9 5 Before the question arose, however,
the Department of Public Health adopted a regulation which absolutely
banned the spraying of asbestos within Philadelphia.9 6 Moreover, a
substitute for asbestos spray fireproofing has recently been discovered. 7
Assuming the validity of the AMS power to block construction
permits, the asbestos cases demonstrate the unique efficacy of that
power in a context in which summary fines, injunctions, and even
dramatic criminal prosecutions were of little utility. Nevertheless,
judicial hesitancy to order immediate shut-downs of dangerous commercial polluters remains a substantial problem. In May 1971, for
example, AMS filed a request for a preliminary injunction in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, urging immediate restraint of
a firm which allegedly was emitting, at intermittent intervals, large
quantities of highly toxic chlorine gas into the air. 98 The seriousness
of the allegation is apparent: chlorine gas had been used during World
War I as a lethal agent and had been subsequently banned by the
Geneva Convention.
Despite the urgency of the problem, however,
the court took under advisement the request for a preliminary injunction and failed to rule on it for two months. Fortunately, however, the
93. Id.
94. Interview with Frederick Voigt, Assistant City Solicitor, in Philadelphia,
June 30, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Voigt Interview]; 1971 King Interview, supra
note 61. See AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-301(9).
95. The Department of Health has apparently been granted the power to block
construction permits in some instances. See note 72 supra.
The Department's experience with the Venzie and Wilson cases would seem
to discount any claim of arbitrary action by a disappointed applicant and should, at
the very least, shift the burden of proof to the applicant, leaving him free to
demonstrate that his methods of containment are likely to prove substantially more
effective than those of previous defendants. Given the substantial dangers involved,
this burden should properly be a very difficult one to meet.
96. See note 29 supra. It was felt that a Department of Public Health regulation was more appropriate than an APCB regulation because matters of occupational
health, as well as ambient air quality, were involved.
97. 1971 King Interview, supra note 61.
98. City v. Franklin Smelting & Ref. Co., No. 176 (C.P. Phila., filed June 7,
1971), rev'd, 3 Pa. Comm. 626, 284 A.2d 339 (1971).
99. Geneva Protocol, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
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pendency of the action did put sufficient pressure on the firm to cause
it to take necessary remedial measures, so that the court's intervention
ultimately became unnecessary. 00
C.
1.

Incinerators

Private

In a third context, powers of inspection, licensing, summary
prosecution, and sealing of equipment have been effectively used in
combination.
A regulation applying to small incinerators10 ' was promulgated
in the spring of 1969 pursuant to the Air Pollution Control Ordinance of March 9, 1954102' (apparently in anticipation of the 1969
Air Management Code's adoption a few months later). During the
months immediately preceding the May 19, 1971 deadline for compliance with this regulation, AMS made a vigorous effort to insure
general compliance.' 03
As a result of inspections, education, and credible threats of daily
$300 fines for continued operation of nonconforming units after the
deadline, no fewer than 931 incinerators were closed down or sealed before May 19, 1971, and 272 of those remaining in operation were known
to be equipped with the necessary controls to meet the regulation's
requirements.'
Only 291 units were in violation; of these, 168 were
privately owned, and AMS announced its intention to write notices
of violation each day, and to refer all such violations for summary
prosecution until the units were either shut down or properly controlled. 10 5 By September 1971, 25 of these incinerators had been
upgraded and all of the others, plus 94 not found earlier, had been
100. 1971 King Interview, supra note 61.
101. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Regulation Relating to

Control of Incinerators, as amended, Apr. 8, 1969. Large incinerators, with changing
rates between 500 and 10,000 pounds per hour, were required to conform to the
regulation a year earlier, on May 19, 1970. Id. § 5A(d-1)(e). Incinerators with
changing rates in excess of 10,000 pounds per hour were given until May 19, 1973, to
comply. Id. § 5A(d-1)(g). Since virtually the only incinerators of this size were
operated by the City itself, this provision understandably has been rather cynically
regarded as allowing the City to delay for five years, while all other operators
were required to comply in one or two. This impression has hardly been dispelled
by a recent AMS report which notes that "a bond issue [is] to be included in
the 1973 Capital Budget for $25,000,000. Due to the complexity of the proposed
installation, completion is not expected until January 1976." City of Philadelphia,
Dep't of Public Health, Bureau of Air Management Services, 15 Major Air Pollution
Problems: Status Reports, Oct. 28, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Major Pollution
Problems].
102. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
103. City of Philadelphia, Dep't of Public Health, Bureau of Air Management
Services, Compliance & Enforcement Div., Annual Report, at 4, June 30, 1971
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Annual Report].
104. Id.
105. Id.
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shut down. By mid-1972, a total of 7200 incinerators had been licensed,
and all known private incinerators were in compliance. 0 6
2.

Public

The enforcement strategy against small incinerators was not
applied, however, to units operated by the Philadelphia School District
and the Philadelphia Housing Authority because AMS personnel recognized that the strategy was unlikely to yield the desired results against
such polluters. 107 Assuming that AMS had legal standing to enforce
a City ordinance against these agencies, and assuming further that
the ordinance applied to their actions and was not susceptible to the
defense of sovereign immunity - all interesting questions, the strategy
nevertheless would have had severe practical limitations if applied to
these institutions. The publicity aspect of summary fines was likely
to backfire, particularly with respect to the School District, a taxsupported operation perennially short of funds. Sealing of equipment
was equally impracticable; indeed, sealing of incinerators in high-rise
public housing projects could have lead to rapid accumulation of trash
and garbage which would have posed an equally great threat to health.
AMS therefore did not attempt to use these weapons against the
School District or the Housing Authority, but instead embarked upon
a vigorous campaign of rational persuasion, buttressed by political
pressure. Facilities were aggressively inspected, letters were written,
and school board members were invited to discuss the situation directly
with the highest AMS officials. °8
The results of this effort were somewhat less impressive than
those of the more direct strategy aimed at private incinerators, but
they were, nevertheless, substantial. Even though neither the School
District nor the Housing Authority met the May 19 deadline,' both
agencies did submit plans for delayed compliance," 0 and both eventually
met these schedules as agreed."'
Thus, in the context of incinerator regulation, the enforcement
powers of inspection, licensing, sealing of unlicensed equipment, and
106. City of Philadelphia, Dep't of Public Health, Bureau of Air Management
Services, Compliance & Enforcement Div., Annual Report, at 19, June 30, 1972
[hereinafter cited as 1972 Annual Report].

107. 1971 King Interview, supra note 61.
108. AMS reported in May 1971 that "members of AMS met with School Board
representatives to impress upon them that the School Board, like all other incinerator operators, must meet the requirements of the Incinerator Regulation- .
[or] be shut down by the end of May . . . ." APC MoNITOR 2 (May 1971).
109. 1971 Annual Report, supra note 103, at 4-5.
110. Id.
111. 1972 King Interview, supra note 33.
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summary prosecution have been effective against most privately owned
units, but not against those which are publicly owned.
D.

The "Top 15"

The full panoply of AMS enforcement powers has been applied
against Philadelphia's fifteen major air polluters with varying degrees
of success. These fifteen prominent polluters 112 were somewhat arbitrarily" 8 identified by AMS as the primary focus of its regulatory
efforts shortly after the 1969 Code was adopted." 4
1.

Image-conscious Corporations

Among the top seven polluters, four are enormous private corporations with substantial involvement in consumer marketing, and a
112. The original "Top 15" were:
1. Philadelphia Electric Company
2. Atlantic Refinery
3. Gulf Refinery
4. City of Philadelphia (6 incinerators & sewage treatment)
5. Allied Chemical Corporation
6. Philadelphia Coke Company
7. Rohm & Haas Company
8. George Sall Metals Company
9. Franklin Smelting Company
10. Enterprise Rendering Company
11. Grey Iron Foundry Industry (6 plants)
12. National Lead Company
13. Celotex Corporation
14. General Smelting Company
15. ESB Incorporated (smelting)
City of Philadelphia, Dep't of Public Health, Bureau of Air Management Services,
Report to the Air Pollution Control Board, Oct. 14, 1969 (unpaginated).
By October 1970, Enterprise Rendering and General Smelting had ceased
all operations in Philadelphia, and ESB Smelting had ceased lead smelting operations.
The "Rendering Industry" (6 plants), the federal government, and Crown Cork &
Seal Company were substituted respectively for positions 10, 14, and 15 on the
revised list. Major Pollution Problems, supra note 101.
113. Identification posed a problem because there were no current inventory
sources of existing polluters. AMS was forced to rely partly on a 1966 emission
inventory and partly on the volume of complaints received from the public against
Farticular firms. City personnel, who prefer to remain anonymous, report that at
east a few of the choices were ultimately made on an arbitrary basis. Nevertheless,
the listing is generally accepted as being substantially correct.
114. The decision to make such a list public was a bold innovation among air
pollution control agencies, since similar lists utilized elsewhere had proved to be
"political dynamite." Interview with Edward F. Wilson, Assistant Commissioner of
Public Health for AMS, in Philadelphia, Feb. 18, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Wilson
Interview].
Before the Code was adopted, emissions by most of these major polluters
were within the prescribed limits; regulations adopted pursuant to the 1954 Air
Pollution Control Ordinance applied only to such nuisance-type emissions as open
burning (which remained lawful under certain conditions), sand blasting, laundry
lint filters, rendering plant odors, paint spraying, nighttime operation of incinerators,
and dense smokestack emissions. See City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control
Board, Regulations, revised, July 27, 1966.
The 1969 Code changed the situation fundamentally by adopting the philosophy
that "elimination of air contaminants is essential . . . [for] sustaining life in an
urban area" and by providing means to reach this goal. AIR MANAGEMENT CODE
§ 3-101(1) (d).
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fifth is a large public utility, also heavily dependent on publicgoodwill.
Against these five, a "carrot and stick" enforcement strategy was
remarkably effective. The stick consisted primarily of publicity and the
threat of publicity; the carrot was the willingness of AMS to work
realistically with polluters toward adoption of reasonable schedules
for delayed compliance, involving step-by-step deadlines flexible enough
to allow for unforeseen problems. Moreover, it was AMS policy not
to prosecute for emissions which the polluter had agreed to correct
in accordance with an accepted compliance schedule, provided the deadlines were being met."' By the fall of 1971, Philadelphia Electric
Company, the number one polluter, had reduced its 1969 sulfur dioxide
emissions by 61 per cent and its 1969 particulate emissions by 86 per
cent, and was in full compliance with all AMS regulations.",, AMS
had accepted schedules for delayed compliance, calling for substantial
expenditures, from Atlantic Richfield Corporation and Gulf Oil Corporation." 7 Rohm & Haas Company had converted its power plant
operations from coal to low sulfur oil, had reduced sulfuric acid production, and had undertaken engineering studies to evaluate the company's status with reference to a proposed hydrocarbon regulation." 8
Allied Chemical Corporation had made major process changes, including the discontinuance of certain products, and was actively studying
other complex, noxious odor problems. Public complaints against the
firm fell from 91 in 1970 to 32 in 1971, and violations fell from twenty
to four."

9

City personnel believed the major ingredient in these enforcement successes was the publicity and nuisance value of summary prosecutions. 20 They stressed that, unlike other forms of legal action which
can be protracted beyond comprehension by procedural objections, discovery techniques, and the like, a summons to Philadelphia Municipal
Court had to be answered directly, and there was almost no docket
delay. Moreover, unlike an injunctive proceeding in which a firm is
ordered to make improvements, a summary conviction would result
in the firm's unambiguous branding as an evil-doer. Both publicity
potential and nuisance value were enhanced when an officer or supervisory employee was personally named, along with his firm, in the
115. City of Philadelphia, Dep't of Public Health, Bureau of Air Management
Services, Enforcement Procedures 25 (undated mimeograph) [hereinafter cited as
Enforcement Procedures].
116. Major Pollution Problems, supra note 101.
117. Id. Phila. Inquirer, Sept. 15, 1971, at 41, col. 5. See note 191 infra.
118. Major Pollution Problems, supra note 101.
119. Id.
120. Voigt Interview, supra note 94; 1971 King Interview, supra note 61.
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complaint. Such persons had a tendency to appear in court with a number of their subordinates and two or three experienced attorneys.' 2 '
2.

Image-indifferent Corporations

In the case of firms less dependent upon public goodwill, publicity
alone clearly was inadequate to secure compliance. In such cases,
AMS found summary proceedings useful only for their nuisance value
and supplemented them with administrative orders and suits for injunctive relief. In four cases, firms were forced to shut down their
operations for various reasons and the inability to withstand this
combination of AMS pressure played a significant role in the cessation
of their operations.' 2 2 In many of the remaining cases, compliance was
partly or totally secured after an administrative order had been issued
or after an injunction had been sought, or both. With a number of
polluters, the final outcome remains in doubt, since several orders have
been appealed to the L&I Review Board; in other cases, injunctions
and negotiations conducted under the shadow of injunctive relief are
presently pending. 2 ' Moreover, AMS has apparently deferred serious
enforcement efforts in some cases, pending final adoption of APCB
regulations controlling odors. 24
The difficulties experienced by AMS in enforcing the 1969 Code
against image-indifferent and non-consumer-oriented violators are well
illustrated by the case of an automobile wrecking yard which was
finally brought into compliance only after a vigorous enforcement
effort requiring a period of more than two years.
The Bailis Scrap Iron Company was a comparatively easy target
for enforcement efforts. Its incinerator (a metal box large enough to
hold two junk automobile bodies, stacked one atop the other, and used
for burning out their upholstery) was in outrageous disrepair, and
as a result, the company apparently violated AMS regulations almost
every time it used the facility. The firm came to AMS' attention in
1968 when several complaints were received from neighboring residents; despite vigorous enforcement efforts, however, little could be
accomplished until the Air Management Code was adopted. To secure
the proper upgrading of the scrap yard's decrepit incinerator, AMS
utilized a strategy of persuasion or, if necessary, summary prosecution.
The persuasion phase lasted for several months, during which time
121. 1971 King Interview, supra note 61.
122. In addition to the three firms mentioned previously (see note 112 supra),
a fourth, Schneider-Bowman Company, ceased operating its gray iron cupola in
August 1971. 1972 Annual Report, supra note 106, at 17. See note 190 infra.
123. 1972 King Interview, supra note 33.
124. Id.
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several office conferences were held, numerous inspection visits were
made, and letters were exchanged. These tactics caused the scrap yard's
owner to abandon his contention that each violation was a unique and
explainable incident, requiring no substantial changes in future behavior nor more than minor repairs. However, he merely abandoned
this first position in favor of a strategy of delay. Agreeing that basic
repairs might be necessary, he, nevertheless, said that he would have
to study the situation carefully before committing his firm to any
major expenditures.
The second phase of AMS enforcement efforts was designed to
make delay more costly. The agency began referring violation notices
for summary prosecution. This strategy, however, proved wholly ineffective. Months went by and fines were levied, but Bailis made no
effort to repair its incinerator.
Finally, the enforcement agency escalated its enforcement campaign to the ultimate level, and sought an injunction. 125 This third
phase, of course, had an immediate effect. The firm began extensive
repairs ten days after the complaint was signed, and by the time of
the hearing on the complaint, the defendant had agreed to a consent
order incorporating every provision sought by AMS. 1' 6
The important factor in this case, however, is not that the injunction worked, but that summary prosecution did not. Many future
cases will present far more complex situations in which an injunction
may be inappropriate. Injunctions are not well-suited to serve as the
everyday "popgun" of the enforcement arsenal. They require too
much effort and expense and are too dangerous, since the court may
order a remedy which allows the defendant to continue polluting while
immunizing him from other enforcement action. If the fines imposed
on Bailis had negligible effect on this relatively small firm, it seems
unlikely that the same strategy will be any more effective on larger
firms, for which the same fines would represent an even smaller percentage of the cost of the required improvements.
3.

Government-operated Installations

A third group of major polluters consisted of installations operated by the City and the federal government. These included refuse
incinerators, sewage treatment plants, and a naval firefighting school
which periodically burned substantial quantities of oil in the open air.
Against the City installations, in particular, AMS efforts to secure
125. City v. Bailis, No. 3783 (C.P. Phila., filed May 22, 1970).
126. City v. Bailis, No. 3783 (C.P. Phila., order of June 4, 1970).
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emission reductions through persuasion made only modest headway.
Unfortunately, no other enforcement tools appeared available against
public polluters.

27

E. Motor Vehicles
In a fifth enforcement context, the enforcement powers of inspection and summary prosecution have been rendered ineffective by inappropriate delegation.
In 1956, the APCB adopted a regulation, 2 8 which continued in
force under the new Code 129 and which prohibited visible emissions
from motor vehicles.'
Before the 1969 Code was adopted, AMS had
attempted to enforce the vehicular emissions regulation in a curious
and cumbersome fashion.' 3 ' City policemen had been authorized to
stop smoky vehicles and issue their operators "citations," copies of
which were then forwarded to AMS. The air pollution control unit
then obtained the addresses of the owners of the vehicles and sent out
"notices of violation."'1 2 Each notice letter demanded that the owner
repair his vehicle and inform AMS as soon as the repair was completed; summary legal action was threatened in the event that the
owner failed to reply.' 3 Due to lack of manpower and the low priority
accorded this effort, however, no further action was ever taken on
84
these cases.'
127. See notes 151-58 and accompanying text infra.
128. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Regulations Relating
to Motor Vehicles, July 27, 1966. New regulations have recently been enacted.
City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg. IX, July 18,
1972. See note 142 infra.
129. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg.
I, § VI, Apr. 10, 1970, provides that "[all existing regulations of the Air Pollution
Control Board not in conflict with these regulations shall remain in force." The
only possible conflict is with Air Management Regulation II, which generally limits
emissions from any source. City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air
Management Reg. II, § I, Apr. 10, 1970.
130. The regulation provided:
No motor vehicle shall emit visible fumes, gases, mists, smokes, or vapors, other
than water in any form
(a) while stationary, or
(b) while in motion, except for the first one hundred yards after starting.
Persons maintaining or operating motor vehicles for commercial purposes shall
conduct periodic visual and odor tests of the motor exhaust both in the shop
and on the street. Motors shall be maintained in such manner and drivers so
instructed and trained in operating techniques that air pollution from the motors
is minimized.
City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Regulations, § 5A(r), revised,
July 27, 1966.
131. 1971 King Interview, supra note 61. See AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRESS
1-2 (Feb. 1968).
132. More than 25,000 of these letters were sent during the seven-year period
from 1961 to 1968, an average of 300 per month. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRESS
1-2 (Feb. 1968).

133. This was actually an empty threat since no penalties were provided for

violation of the 1954 Code. The City's only alternative would have been a suit for
injnnction to restrain a continuing violation. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 3-103 (1954).
134. Wilson Interview, supra note 114.
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Notwithstanding the lack of follow-up, the enforcement system
did result in the repair of several hundred vehicles each year. 3 5 Perhaps more importantly, it demonstrated the willingness and ability of
the Philadelphia police to enforce air pollution regulations against
motor vehicles. In one month of particularly vigorous enforcement,
36
the police wrote more than 1600 citations.'
About the time of the Code's adoption, AMS quietly abandoned
its attempts to enforce the vehicular emissions regulation in the belief
that its cumbersome enforcement method was simply too ineffective to
be worth the effort. Undoubtedly, the bureau also found embarrassing
the data generated by the system, since it appeared to show that the
3
program was a failure.'

7

After lengthy consideration, AMS selected a more direct method
of enforcing the regulation, which, though likely to be even less effective, promised at least to yield better statistics and avoided the bureaucratically unpleasant prospect of giving up an area of enforcement
responsibility. The new method involved the assignment of AMS
inspectors to work in teams with policemen. 8' The policeman in each
case stopped the offending vehicle; the AMS inspector took Polaroid
photographs of the emission and wrote the violation notice. The inspector later assisted in prosecuting the case in municipal court.
The difficulty with this system was that the modest number of
AMS inspectors available for the task could not possibly have discovered more than a negligible fraction of existing violations. 3 9 Moreover, unlike most other air pollution enforcement tasks, identification
of "visible emissions" required no particular expertise; assignment of
highly qualified, specialized personnel to this task seems both unnecessary and wasteful.
AMS personnel argued, however, that any attempt to delegate
this entire enforcement responsibility to the police department would
have encountered two obstacles. First, the legality of such a delegation was questioned. Second, AMS feared that policemen would not
be reliable as witnesses, and therefore, summary prosecution cases
135. In the typical month of September 1966, 247 vehicles were cited, 142 letters
were sent out by AMS, and 88 motorists reported that they had repaired their
vehicles. During 1968, there were 7713 citations, and 1978 motorists claimed repairs.
For 1969, 6098 citations were issued, and 1027 repairs were claimed. This data is
filed with the City of Philadelphia, Dep't of Public Health, AMS Compliance &
Enforcement Division.
136. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRESS 2 (Feb. 1968).
137. Typically, a very high percentage of responses was received early in the
year, but increasingly few responses were received as each year went on, so that
by the end of the year the cumulative percentage of repairs made was only about
ten per cent of the letters sent out. APC MONITOR (Jan. 1968 through Dec. 1969).
138. Evening Bulletin (Phila.), Aug. 12, 1971, at 4, col. 3.
139. 1971 King Interview, supra note 61.
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would be lost and the Bureau's continuing effort to secure judicial
cooperation would be undermined. The second of these considerations
is difficult to evaluate, but there are reasons to doubt that the feared
results would occur.' 40 The first alleged obstacle appears to be little
more than a makeweight."'
A more serious objection made by AMS was that even if the
present visible emission regulation could be enforced more appropriately by police, future motor vehicle regulations are likely to be more
sophisticated and expert enforcement is more likely to be needed. 4 2 In
the event of such a development, it is difficult to see what would prevent AMS from re-assuming all or part of the enforcement responsibility at that time. 143 It is suggested that the agency's fears are more
44
illusory than real.1
140. Prosecutions could be handled in a manner analogous to the practice in
Philadelphia Traffic Court, where summary proceedings on the basis of affidavits
are common practice; policemen would appear as witnesses in cases which are
appealed and in which a trial de novo is required. In the vast majority of traffic
cases, the defendant loses and no appeal is taken. Experience of the Philadelphia
Traffic Court, which relies almost entirely on police witnesses, indicates that
unavailability of policemen and inadequacy of police testimony account for far fewer
prosecutorial failures than might be expected. Interview with John Patrick Walsh,
President Judge, Philadelphia Traffic Court, in Philadelphia, Oct. 16, 1972.
During the 1972 fiscal year, a total of 245 visible exhaust emission cases were
prosecuted in Philadelphia Municipal Court, with 207 cases resulting in the party
being found guilty. A total of $7220 in fines, plus $1333 in costs, or an average total
of $41 per violator, was assessed. 1972 Annual Report, supra note 106, at 18.
141. The intention of City Council is clearly that "all City of Philadelphia agencies
shall cooperate in the implementation of this Title." AIR MANAGEMENT CODE
§ 3-101(3) (a). Moreover, the Philadelphia Police Department is authorized to
enforce all City ordinances, the scope of which would include the Air Management
Code. HOME RULE CHARTER § 5-201.
142. The most recent regulation relating to control of visible emissions from
mobile sources provides:
A. No person shall permit, cause, suffer, or allow the discharge into the
atniosphere of a visible emission of air contaminants except uncombined water
from a gasoline powered motor vehicle at any time, except for three (3)
consecutive seconds after starting the engine.
D. No person shall permit, cause, suffer, or allow the discharge into the
atmosphere of a visible emission of air contaminants except uncombined water
in excess of 20 percent opacity from a motor vehicle at any time.
E. Persons certified by the Department may make observations to determine compliance with . . .Part D of this Regulation without direct reference to
standards.
City of Philadelphia, Air Pollution Control Board, Air Management Reg. IX, July
18, 1972.
143. The Code itself explicitly provides that "[t]he Department [of Public
Health - AMS] shall be responsible for the administration and enforcement of this
Title and all regulaticns adopted hereunder." AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-301(2).
It seems, therefore, that AMS could not irrevocably delegate this duty even if it
wanted to. So long as AMS maintains reasonable supervision, there is nothing to
suggest that it could not allow another department to assist with the enforcement of
particular regulations. Indeed, the Code's intent plainly is that all departments shall
assist to the degree requested. Id. § 3-103(3) (a). See note 141 supra.
144. Indeed, in recent months, after preliminary drafts of this article were circulated, the agency's attitude has begun to change. In June 1972, AMS announced
that it was "exploring the possibility of turning the entire operation over to the
Police Department." 1972 Annual Report, supra note 106, at 18.
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ANALYSIS OF ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS

A.

Governmental Immunity

We have noted that the Philadelphia School District, the Philadelphia Housing Authority, and the local United States Naval Base
have been slow to comply with particular AMS regulations. 45 To this
list, the Philadelphia Water Department 146 and the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA)1 47 could also be added.
The failure of such public polluters to limit their emissions jeopardizes the City's air management program in two ways. Not only is
there a direct and substantial deleterious effect on the quality of the
air,"' but when the City attempts to prosecute a polluter for an offense
of which the City itself or another public polluter is also guilty,"4 9 the
support of the public and the judiciary for effective compliance and
enforcement is seriously undermined.
Perhaps with these factors in mind, City Council, in adopting
the Code, declared its intent to be that:
(a) all City of Philadelphia agencies shall cooperate in the implementation of this Title;
(b) wherever permitted by law, the provisions of this Title shall
apply to all governmental jurisdictions and their agencies in
the operation of facilities located within the City of Philadelphia; [and]
(c) the Department of Public Health of the City of Philadelphia
shall cooperate with other governmental jurisdictions in the
control and elimination of air pollution ....
145. See notes 107-11 & 127 and accompanying text supra.
146. The Water Department's program for abatement of offensive odor emissions
from the City's three sewage treatment plants consisted of a few temporary measures
and a promise to develop comprehensive control plans in the distant future. Such
plans "are to be developed in conjunction with projected plant expansion programs ...
scheduled [for] 1975 .. . 1976 . . . and . . . 1977." Major Pollution Problems, supra
note 101, at 5.
147. SEPTA was the subject of a criminal complaint filed on October 7, 1971.
As of that date, AMS files contained 80 violations by SEPTA, and the latter had
failed to submit an improvement plan satisfactory to AMS. The Philadelphia District Attorney indicated that the main objective of the court action was "to obtain
a court-ordered abatement program from SEPTA, setting down specific remedies to
the problem." Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 8, 1971, at 25, col. 8. Again, as in the asbestos
case, suit was grounded on a criminal nuisance theory. See note 82 and accompanying
text vupra.
148. Philadelphia's municipal refuse incinerators alone are estimated to emit 2.3
tons of sulfur dioxide, 16.5 tons of particulates, 3.0 tons of nitric oxide, 31,4 tons of
organic compounds, and 53.0 tons of carbon monoxide into the City's air each day.
This data, compiled in 1966, is filed with the City of Philadelphia, Dep't of Health,
AMS Laboratory.
149. A Philadelphia prosecutor reports that defendants in numerous summary
prosecutions have raised the example of City incinerators as relevant in mitigation
of their own penalties and even as a defense, and that at least one judge has been
persuaded, in light of the City's "hypocrisy," to dismiss entirely actions against such
private pollutors. Voigt Interview, supra note 94.
150. AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-101(3).
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Unfortunately, these well-intended provisions do little to solve the
problems which they identify. Similarly, it is not likely that solutions
will be found in future ordinances, since the problems are largely
beyond the jurisdiction of City Council.
Three classes of public polluters may be distinguished, each of
which presents its own difficulties. Governmental units, such as federal
installations and school districts, form a class which is most clearly
immune from AMS regulatory authority. 5 ' Fortunately, however, the
President has ordered all federal government installations to comply
with pollution laws applicable to the jurisdictions of their situs.'52 In
the event that local federal installations fail to comply with this order,
however, it is unclear whether AMS has standing to complain.' 53 In
the face of state and school district violations, AMS can do little more
than attempt to persuade the officials involved or to threaten them
with adverse publicity. Surprisingly, this combination of tactics appears thus far to have had a strong impact on the members of the
Board of the Philadelphia School District, who, despite continuing
financial difficulties, have now complied with all applicable regulations.'
Since the School District's compliance was belated, however,
it is clear that such tactics are generally less effective than the strategy
applied to similarly-situated private polluters.
A second class of public polluters consists of authorities chartered
by the state to perform various public functions within the City of
Philadelphia. These include the Philadelphia Housing Authority and
SEPTA. To the degree that each of these authorities performs bona
fide public, quasi-governmental functions, they would appear to be
immune to civil tort suit as well as to criminal liability.' 55 Such attthorities are almost certainly immune to summary prosecution, and it is
151. Since the Code defines air pollution to be a nuisance, violation of the Code
may amount to a tort, but even so, the principle of sovereign immunity would seem
to apply. A school district may not be sued without its own or the legislature's
statutory consent. In re Sykesville Borough, 91 Pa. Super. 335 (1927). Moreover,
it is generally not liable for its torts. Michael v. Lancaster School Dist., 391 Pa. 209,
137 A.2d 456 (1958).
152. Exec. Order No. 11507, 3 C.F.R. 889 (Supp. 1972). Compliance with these
requirements at existing federal facilities is to be "completed or underway by December 31, 1972." Id. § 5, at 891.
153. Federal facilities are required to abide by emission standards duly adopted
pursuant to the Clean Air Act, as amended, or "more stringent requirements" where
"deemed advisable" by "the respective Secretary, in consultation with appropriate
Federal, State, interstate and local agencies .......
Id. §§ 4(a) (1), 4(b), at 890-91.
154. Wilson Interview, supra note 114.
155. A housing authority, which is an agent and instrumentality of the federal
government, has been held not to be subject to either state or municipal building
regulations. United States v. Philadelphia, 56 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1944), aff'd, 147
F.2d 291 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 870 (1945). This principle would also seem
to apply to a housing authority explicitly designated an agency of the Commonwealth
(see PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 1550 (Supp. 1972)), with reference to any municipal ordinance based on the police power of the municipality to protect the health and safety
of itscitizens.
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not clear whether they could be enjoined from violation of a City ordinance. If they could, there is little to distinguish them from the first
class. Indeed, AMS' enforcement strategy apparently has been the same
for both classes, and has had similar results.
A third class consists of other departments of City government.
The Streets Department and the Water Department are of particular
importance. The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter appears to prevent
any department in City government from issuing an order against any
other department.'5 6 Moreover, it is obviously absurd for one department to prosecute another for a penalty. Nor can the City sue to enjoin
itself from violating its own ordinances. The only method by which
AMS can secure compliance by other departments involves the application of bureaucratic pressures within City government itself. As a
mere bureau, 15 7 AMS is not well equipped to insure that its concerns
receive the high priority they deserve. Notwithstanding this handicap
and the lack of enforcement alternatives, the agency seems to have
made some progress; but it is quite clear, however, that AMS has
no means whatsoever, beyond its powers of rational and bureaucratic
persuasion, by which to insure that other City agencies comply with
the Code. Against this class of polluters, AMS even lacks the weapon
of publicity, since its exercise would be politically untenable. 8
The general problems of sovereign immunity and administrative
law raised by these observations are mentioned because air pollution,
by its very nature, tends to require more stringent regulation in cities
than elsewhere. Furthermore, cities are likely to continue enacting
156. The Charter provides:
Coordination of Work. The several departments .

.

. shall devise a practical and

working basis for cooperation and coordination of work ....

The head of any

department or any board or commission may empower or require an employee
of another department, board or commission, subject to the consent of the head of
such department or of such board or commission, to perform any duty which he or
it might require of the employees of his or its department, board or commission.
HOME RULE CHARTER § 8-401 (emphasis added).
157. Drafters of the Code had originally intended to create a new Department of
Air Management to administer the new statute. The City Solicitor, however, ruled
that the Home Rule Charter prevented City Council from establishing any new
departments by ordinance, and that, therefore, a Charter amendment, involving a
public referendum, would have been required. See HOME RULE CHARTER § 1-102(2).
Drafters and Council alike agreed that this process would have been simply too
cumbersome to be justified by the modest advantage sought, and therefore, a Bureau
of Air Management Services was instead created within the existing Department of
Public Health. Wilson Interview, supra note 114.
158. The City's Managing Director, appointed by the Mayor, HOME RULE CHARTER
§ 3-204, appoints the heads of the Police, Fire, Health, Streets, Licenses and Inspections, Recreation, Welfare, Water, Public Property, and Records Departments, with
approval of the Mayor. Id. § 3-206.
activities of these departments. Id. §
the Health Department of any other
Managing Director and the Mayor of the Mayor's direct subordinates.

He also exercises supervisory
5-100. Therefore, any criticism
department would amount to a
an allegation which would little
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ordinances such as Philadelphia's Air Management Code, requiring
more stringent limitation of emissions than those required by county,
state, and federal law. And since city, state, and federal instrumentalities are substantial air polluters almost everywhere, it is important that
they conform to local regulations.
One possible response to these problems is to create, whenever
possible, overlapping jurisdictions to deal with public polluters. The
Governor of Pennsylvania could issue a proclamation similar to the
President's Executive Order;159 the City of Philadelphia could once
again be placed within the jurisdiction of state air pollution laws;16
or citizens' groups could be given standing to sue public polluters for
their failure to conform to either local or state regulations."'
Another approach, not inconsistent with the first, is that taken by
the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1967.162 This legislation
gives federal authorities power to intercede and to take over all or part
of any state's air pollution control program whenever the state fails
to pass adequate laws or to enforce them with adequate vigor. 163 Both
past history and present reflection suggest that full exercise of such
take-over power would be unwise. When the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's APC re-assumed control over Philadelphia's air pollution
control program in 1968, it quickly discovered that it lacked the resources, data, and experience to carry the burden of routine enforce159. See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
160. At present, Philadelphia County and Allegheny County are exempt from state
control. Section 12(b) of the Air Pollution Control Act provides:

[T]he Administrative procedures for the abatement . . . of air pollution set forth
in this act shall not apply to any political subdivision of the Commonwealth
which has an approved air pollution control agency.
PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4012 (Supp. 1972).
Recent amendments to the Act provide for intervention by the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources: (1) whenever a violation of air pollution
control standards, rules, or regulations continues to exist after notification to the
local air pollution control agency involved; and (2) whenever the Department finds
that violations of the air pollution control standards, rules, or regulations "are so
widespread that such violations appear to result from a failure of the local control
agency involved to enforce" those standards, rules, or regulations. Act No. 245, §§
12(c), (d) (Oct. 26, 1972). In addition, the Department may refuse, suspend, or
rescind approval, of any local agency if it finds such agency "unable or unwilling so
to conduct an air pollution control program as to abate or reduce air pollution problems within its jurisdiction in an effective manner." Id. § 12(e).
161. The recent amendments to Pennsylvania's Air Pollution Control Act accomplish this result. Every "department, board, bureau or agency of the Commonwealth,
political subdivision, municipality, district, authority or any other legal entity whatsoever" is prohibited from polluting. Act No. 245, §3(3) (Oct. 26, 1972). While
public entities are generally exempted from the summary penalty and misdemeanor
provisions (see id. §§ 9(a), (b)), they are not exempt from sections providing for
civil penalties or injunctive relief. Id. §§ 9.1, 10. Moreover, all Commonwealth
residents are given standing to sue on behalf of the Commonwealth to restrain violations of the act, without any showing of individual harm, whenever the Attorney General fails to proceed after thirty-days notice. Id. § 10(f).
162. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970).
163. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency may either issue
administrative orders or bring civil actions for damages against individual polluters.
Id. § 1857c-8(a) (2).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

18: p. 17'3

ment in the City.' 4 The federal bureaucracy would seem even less
likely to exercise successfully the responsibility for such routine enforcement activity. 65 On the other hand, occasional federal intervention in cases involving city incinerators, public transportation systems,
and school districts, would seem to be quite appropriate. In such

cases, the federal bureaucracy has the advantage of being removed
from local politics, and the further advantage of access to the very
potent weapons of delaying and withholding various federal subsidies.
These federal enforcement tools, indeed, are virtually tailored for use
against public polluters.
One additional enforcement agency is also helping to secure the
compliance of public polluters. The Philadelphia District Attorney
has filed actions against both SEPTA (for its buses) and the City
(for its incinerators). 6 Since the District Attorney has no technical
staff, however, his intervention is necessarily of limited scope. However, his ability to focus public concern on important issues which might
otherwise escape attention and, therefore, be dealt with too casually by
7
public officials, provides some additional and necessary pressure.'
B.

Reviewability of Administrative Orders

The administrative order6

8

is potentially a valuable enforcement

tool. It would be most useful as an alternative to summary prosecution
of petty violators and to injunctions against major polluters where
complex technical issues are involved. Prior to the issuance of each
order, factual issues could be determined by administrative process,
164. During the period from May 1968 until May 1970, during which the Commonwealth had jurisdiction over Philadelphia's air pollution problems, it did virtually
nothing about them. The only exception to the Commonwealth's ostrich stance was
a single suit against the City for failure to control access to City dumps. The City's
negligence in this regard had resulted in numerous fires started by vandals and
scavengers, the smoke from which contributed to air pollution. Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 2,
1970, at 39, col. 1.
165. See note 163 supra.
166. See note 147 supra. The suit against the City was filed in November 1971.
167. See text accompanying notes 79-85 supra.
168. AMS is given broad authority to issue orders under the Air Management
Code:
(1) . . . [Whenever AMS] determines that the Air Management Code or
the regulations adopted under it require any action or forebearance from any
action to be effected by order, it shall make an order requiring such action or
forebearance.
(2) All such orders shall be in writing . . . except that where . . . [AMS]
finds willfulness or a menace to public health requiring immediate corrective action
such orders may be oral in the first instance.
(4) While an appeal from an order . . . is
pending, compliance with such
order shall not be required unless . . . [AMS] finds, and certifies in writing in
such order, that immediate compliance is necessary to protect the public health.
AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-305.
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with the scope of judicial review thus limited to whether there existed
evidence adequate to support the agency findings, and whether the
proceedings were fundamentally fair to the parties." 9
Despite these potential values, AMS has failed to exercise its
specific authority to issue administrative orders in more than a handful
of cases. 170 For all practical purposes, the power lies dormant. The
explanation for this curious state of affairs emerges from an analysis
of provisions in the Code and the Home Rule Charter relating to
appeals from such orders.
The 1969 Air Management Code provides that orders issued by
AMS may be appealed formally to the Commissioner of Public Health,
as a matter of right. 17 ' The City Solicitor has interpreted this provision to require a formal hearing with stenographic transcription
of the proceedings.1 72 Standards for the Commissioner's review are
clearly defined in the Code, as is the scope of the hearing.'" This
appeal is surely not required to meet the demands of due process, but
does provide an additional safeguard against arbitrary action at a
moderate administrative cost, and is therefore not objectionable. 74
169. Cf. PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 211.403 (Supp. 1972).
170. Only three orders were issued during the 1970-71 fiscal year. Interview with
Robert W. King, Assistant Director, AMS Compliance & Enforcement Division, in
Philadelphia, Oct. 25, 1971 [hereinafter cited as King Interview]. The official policy
of AMS is to issue orders only in cases of "persistent" open burning, smoke emission,
dust problems, odor emissions, or use of high sulfur fuels. "However, where Air
Management Services is of the opinion that an order will not result in compliance,
injunctive action will be taken." Enforcement Procedures, supra note 115, at 3. The
thrust of the statement seems to be that orders are to be issued only in cases where
it is expected that injunctive action will be unnecessary; if it is anticipated that an
order is likely to be ignored or appealed, no order is to issue but injunctive action
is to be initiated instead. This interpretation of AMS policy is supported by the
paucity of orders actually issued as compared to injunctions initiated. Ten injunctive
actions were initiated during the 1970-71 fiscal year. 1971 Annual Report, supra
note 103, at 5. For most of 1972, AMS was temporarily forced to abandon this
policy. The agency issued orders even in cases where AMS expected the polluters
to appeal them due to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's decision in Philadelphia v. Franklin Smelting & Ref. Co., 3 Pa. Comm. 626, 284 A.2d 339 (1971).
The court held that an equitable injunction could not be granted to abate air pollution
in a case where AMS had neither issued an order to the polluter nor pleaded that
irreparable harm would occur unless the injunction were granted. In September 1972,
AMS secured an amendment to the Air Management Code which apparently allows
the agency to avoid the court's result in future cases. Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance
Amending Title 3 of Philadelphia Code, Sept. 14, 1972. By this time, nine orders
had been issued. 1972 Annual Report, supra note 106, at 13-15.
171. The Code provides:
The Health Commissioner, or his designee, shall administratively hear objections
to orders of the Department where error is alleged. Consideration of such
objections shall be limited to adequacy of notice, matters of fact, existence of
violation, and reasonableness of the time specified for compliance. The Health
Commissioner may sustain, modify, or revoke any order where error is found
to exist.
AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-301(22).
172. King Interview, supra note 170.
173. AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-301(22). See note 171 supra.
174. The provision for oral argument is hardly necessary or desirable:
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The major difficulty arises from the existence of a second, superfluous layer of administrative review required by the Home Rule
Charter, which provides that "any . . . order or other action [taken]

as a result of any City inspection, affecting [any person] directly . .
shall be appealable to the L&I Review Board.1 5 This provision apparently applies to almost every conceivable type of order which might
properly be made by AMS, including license revocation, permit revocation, sealing of equipment, abatement, and cease and desist orders,
since each of these depends upon an inspection and each appears to
affect its subject directly.
The existence of this second layer of administrative review seriously undercuts the effectiveness of the order as an AMS enforcement
tool for two reasons. First, it offers the polluter an opportunity to
create substantial delay, at almost no cost to himself. The Board
meets infrequently and has a backlog of almost one year.176 Its decisions are binding on AMS, but not on the polluter. 7 T More importantly, L&I review places ultimate administrative responsibility
for amendment and enforcement of the order in the hands of a
board whose members have no particular expertise appropriate to
this specialized task and who are unlikely even to be sympathetic to
the AMS position.'17 These concerns become even more important
when it is realized that the primary values of administrative orders
are in speeding up compliance by petty violators, and in insuring the
issuing agency the optimum possible footing in court actions required
to secure the compliance of large polluters. 9 If the Code's provisions
for issuance of administrative orders are to become workable and
fulfill the important functions for which they were intended, the Home
Rule Charter will have to be amended so as to exempt AMS orders
from L&I review.
The essential and underlying principle of the leading cases . . . is that the
parties to the proceeding are not to be adjudged on evidence undisclosed to them,
but that they are entitled to hear such evidence so that they may rebut or explain
it. It does not follow, however, that . . . such evidence must necessarily be
presented at open hearing ....
[Where the issues are scientific or technical and
involve matters of judgment and interpretation, material] is best presented, not
by transitory oral utterances of witnesses, but in the form of written documents
and reports, which the adjudicating tribunal should be given ample opportunity
to analyze and appraise for relevancy and cogency.
Brown, Public Service Commission Procedure A Problem and A Suggestion,

87 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 160 (1938).
175. HomE RULE CHARTER § 5-1005.
176. Voigt Interview, supra note 94.

177. Wilson Interview, supra note 114.
178. Traditionally, the Mayor has appointed carpenters, plumbers, contractors,

and other non-environmentally skilled persons.
179. See text accompanying notes 168-69 supra.
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The Remedy Dilemma

We have discussed the usefulness of modest summary penalties in
several contexts. 180 However, we have also noted that such penalties
appear to have no substantial effect against image-indifferent polluters,' 8 ' and that, in cases involving toxic emissions such as asbestos,
they appear to be so trivial that their imposition is useless or even
82
counterproductive.
In both of these latter situations, AMS enforcement options have
been severely limited. Truly decisive enforcement action is required
in these contexts, but AMS has only two alternatives and neither of
them is adequate. The alternatives are to seek: (1) to shut down
the firm completely until it can prove its ability to operate in compliance with AMS regulations ;183 or (2) to impose a particular compliance plan upon the firm, the violation of which will be easy to prove
and will result in a shut-down or a fine or both.8 Either of these
strategies can be pursued in the first instance by issuance of an appropriate administrative order.'
If an order is ignored, either strategy
can be pursued by seeking a judicial enforcement order or an injunction.' 6 Even assuming that the present obstacle to the effectiveness
of administrative orders 8 7 is likely to be eliminated, neither strategy
is likely to be effective against image-indifferent polluters, even where
toxic emissions are involved.' 8 8
Consider the case of a large, image-indifferent firm engaged in a
complex manufacturing enterprise involving numerous pollutant emission sources. Proper solution of the pollution problems might require
hundreds or even thousands of process changes, new installations, and
operating-procedure adjustments.' 9 Whole divisions might have to
be re-located or abandoned 9 and millions of dollars might be in180. See, e.g., notes 54-67, 100-05 & 115-21 and accompanying text supra.
181. See notes 122-25 and accompanying text supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
183. AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-103(2) (b).
184. Id. § 3-301(17).

185. Id. § 3-301(3).
186. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Franklin Smelting & Ref. Co., 3 Pa. Comm. 626,
284 A.2d 339 (1971).
187. See notes 175-79 supra.
188. See notes 122-26 and accompanying text supra.
189. See Phila. Inquirier, Sept. 15, 1971, at 41, col. 5.
190. In 1970, the Rohm & Haas Company faced a difficult decision regarding its
sulphuric acid plant - it could either install $700,000 to $800,000 worth of pollution
control equipment or shut down the unit and move operations elsewhere. Greater
Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, Rolling With Anti-Pollution Punches, DELAWARE VALLEY BUSINESS FORTNIGHT

4 (Feb. 9, 1970).

Production was terminated

in 1971. The issue was finally resolved when the plant's two production units were
dismantled in mid-1972. Interview with L. E. Westkaemper, Plant Manager, Rohm
& Haas Co., in Philadelphia, Nov. 13, 1972.
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volved."' Without the active and bona fide cooperation of such a firm,
it would be extremely difficult for AMS to devise an adequate plan to
deal with such complex problems in a reasonable fashion. Nor does it
seem proper for a governmental agency to take on the task; rather, the
burden should rest with the firm itself. Moreover, if the polluter has
not been involved in the development of the plan, it is all too easy
for it to make spurious but plausible arguments that the agency's plan
is unworkable or prohibitively expensive.
On the other hand, a reviewing court is unlikely to accept an
order or injunctive complaint which merely demands that the polluter
cease and desist from further pollution - without explaining how
such a result can be achieved, short of a total and permanent shut-down.
In the absence of an administrative order to which the trial court may
properly defer, a request for an injunction may present a very difficult
factual issue, quite beyond the court's competence to assess. 9 ' In the
Wilson asbestos case,' for example, AMS had the burden of proving
not only that asbestos was toxic (since there was no regulation declaring it to be so), but also that the asbestos was not being totally contained. The court in appointing a doctor of medicine as Master, in
effect admitted its own incompetence to make either decision de novo.
A court of equity, therefore, is likely to shrink from the imposition
of the drastic shut-down remedy whenever possible. Instead, it can be
expected to accept almost any plan proffered by the defendant which
would allow the firm's continued operation but, nevertheless, insure
some reduction in the level of pollution - provided, of course, that
the firm piously intoned, for the record, that its plan would bring its
operations wholly into conformity with the law's demands. That such
a judicial hesitancy is likely to be true, even where toxic emissions are
involved, is also demonstrated by the Wilson case.. 4 in which the court
191. The plan approved by AMS for Atlantic Richfield's Breeze Point Refinery
called for an expenditure of more than $10 million over a four-year period. Evening
Bulletin (Phila.), May 12, 1971, at 4, col. 3.
192. Recognizing this problem, the Code's drafters sought to bolster the position
of AMS by adding an advisory committee provision to the Code. AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-301(23). The rationale of this provision is that, whenever a polluter
claims compliance is impossible, AMS need not "be reasonable" and give him the
benefit of the doubt. Instead, the agency may remain firm in its position, challenge
the polluter to invoke the provision, and thereby cause a neutral advisory committee
of experts to be appointed to decide the issue. The Code's drafters hoped that
such a committee could "take the heat for AMS" and that, if it agreed with the
agency's position, its prestigious support would improve the agency's position before
a reviewing court. Purdom Interview, supra note 8.
In practice, the advisory committee provision has not worked well, mainly
because the Code makes no provision for paying the experts, even though their tasks
are difficult, time-consuming, and sometimes unpopular. Id. By July 1971, the provision had been invoked only once, although two additional requests had been received. Wilson Letter, .mpra note 54.
193. See notes 86-93 and accompanying text npra.
194. Id.
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continued to seek a less drastic remedy even after AMS had shown a
violation of an earlier compromise order. 95
Thus, whether AMS seeks to shut down the polluter or, merely
by the threat of such action, to force it to devise a plan for future
operation in compliance with Air Management Regulations, the outcome of the shut-down strategy is likely to be failure, or at least substantial delay in securing compliance. The polluter need only proffer
the vaguest and most limited of plans in order to escape the drastic
remedy urged by the agency and, likewise, the sanctions which might
flow from ignoring an AMS order to formulate a workable plan.' 96
To prevent the polluter's escape, AMS must maintain control over
the final decision as to the character of the plan which is required in
the particular case and must not leave this decision to the judiciary.
The role of the judiciary must be confined to consideration of whether
the agency properly approved a particular plan, whether the firm's
objections, if any, were duly considered, and whether the firm has put
the plan into effect as required. This strategy requires that AMS
either design a plan of its own or approve a plan proposed by the
polluter. Since in a complex case the agency cannot and should not do
all the work itself, the question again is how the agency can pressure
the polluter to work in good faith in order to develop a plan acceptable
to it. An enforcement tool in addition to publicity is plainly needed.
The tool's exercise must have the same effect on image-indifferent
polluters as publicity has on image-conscious ones; it must goad them
into fashioning plans of their own which will bring them into compliance, albeit delayed.' 9 7 Recent amendments to the Pennsylvania Air
195. Additional support for the conclusion is suggested by the treatment of an
injunctive complaint filed by AMS in May 1971. See text accompanying notes 98-99
supra.
196. Violation of an order of the Department of Public Health (in which AMS
operates) is subject to the same sanctions as violation of any provision of the Code
or any regulation adopted pursuant thereto. AIR MANAGEMENT CODE § 3-103.
197. Reasons for preferring a strategy likely to result in specific compliance
schedules have been noted by three law students in a general study of environmental
law enforcement problems:
The public conception of law enforcement is to see the "criminal" taken to
court. In the area of pollution problems, however, such hasty action actually
dodges the real issue. Successful abatement is best attained by an order tied
to a time schedule with which a company can reasonably comply. It is better
that a company pay a large amount over an extended period to clean up its
processes than to [sic] pay a lump sum criminal fine or civil penalty and not
as adequately abate its problems. A further advantage is that both the enforcement agency and the polluter realize what is expected from them through the
negotiated agreement. Thus, the firm can plan for future costs and the agency
can plan for regular inspection and be prepared to go to court if the stipulations
are wilfully disregarded ....
AMS claims that only "one half of one percent"
of abatement is obtained through court action.
J. Carroll, F. Fletcher & G. Gross, A Perspective On Environmental Law Enforcement in Philadelphia, at 8, Sept. 30, 1971 (on file with the Department of Sociology
at the University of Pennsylvania).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 2
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 18-: p. 173

Pollution Control Act make such a tool available to AMS for the first
time. The agency can now seek, in the court of common pleas, a civil
penalty of up to $10,000, plus $2500 for each additional day of violation, in addition to proceeding under any other remedy available at
law or in equity.' s Whether this new tool will be effectively utilized
by AMS remains to be seen.
Another possible alternative might be a short-term shut-down
penalty of from one to five days during which the offending firm would
be required to continue paying wages to its employees but would be
forced to cease all operations.' 9 Arguably, such a penalty could be
imposed in summary proceedings upon a mere showing that the Code
had been violated.
Had not the singular additional enforcement weapon of substantial
fines been adopted, AMS would have found itself increasingly unable
to deal effectively with polluters. Unfortunately, such a trend had
already appeared. By the fall of 1971, ten separate injunctive actions
were pending against polluters, and a group of perhaps 100-200 others
were at various stages in the administrative process.200 As indicated in
the Bailis example,2 ' 1 such enforcement efforts require substantial
administrative effort. An important factor, not present in the Bailis
case, increased the difficulty of securing effective injunctions against
many of the remaining offenders - the Bailis firm employed fewer
than ten persons. 202 A large employer is likely to be treated more
gently by the courts, as were the construction firms involved in the
asbestos spraying cases.20 3 Moreover, some firms had already spent
substantial sums to clean up their operations in recent years, although
with little positive result.20 4 Such firms might reasonably have been
198. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4009.1, as amended, Act No. 245, § 9.1 (Oct. 26, 1972).

See PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 13131 (1957), which provides:
Ordinances, rules and regulations adopted under the authority of this act or
under the provisions of any charter adopted or amended hereunder shall be
enforceable by the imposition of fines, forfeitures, and penalties, not exceeding

three hundred dollars ($300), and by imprisonment for a period not exceeding
ninety days.

199. No exact precedent for such a penalty has been discovered. The remedies
of license revocation, sealing, and equity abatement have typically been used as
permanent sanctions. The nearest parallel to this proposed limited-term, shut-down
penalty would seem to be the remedy of license suspension. Indeed, if the Home
Rule Charter were amended as urged (see text accompanying note 179 supra), air
management operating licenses could be suspended quickly and with much the same

effect as this proposal. There would, moreover, seem to be no constitutional or
statutory objection to the creation by city ordinance of such an innovative penalty.
200. King Interview, supra note 170.
201. See pp. 189-90 supra.
202. Telephone interview with R. Bailis, President, Bailis Scrap Iron Co., in
Philadelphia, Dec. 30, 1971.

203. See text accompanying notes 72-99 supra.
204. One such firm was the Franklin Smelting & Refining Co. Since 1950, it

had incurred

pollution control

expenditures

totaling $900,000.

Sunday

Bulletin

(Phila.), Oct. 3, 1971, § 7, at 4, col. 1.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss2/2

32

Keeney: Enforcement of Philadelphia's 1969 Air Management Code: The First
DECEMBER

1972]

PHILA. 1969

AIR MANAGEMENT CODE

expected to resist further enforcement and to view $300 fines as a
preferable alternative to additional expenditures for pollution control equipment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Philadelphia's Air Management Code offers a useful model for
analysis of the obstacles likely to impede local enforcement of air
pollution control regulations throughout the country. The main obstacles noted are the immunity of virtually all public polluters to the
effects of local enforcement tools, a procedure for appeal of administrative orders which is weighted too heavily against the enforcement
agency, an initial delegation of one area of enforcement responsibility
to an inappropriate agency, and a recently corrected state-imposed
limitation on maximum fines.
Notwithstanding these considerable obstacles, the local program
studied has quite clearly achieved considerable success.206 Factors
such as the agency's personnel, the effect of federal pressure, 206 and the
205. A major problem now faced by the Philadelphia air pollution control bureaucracy is how to evaluate its own success. In June 1971, AMS produced a brief
compendium of graphs, purporting to answer the tract's title question, "How Clean
Is Philadelphia's Air?" The answer posited was that levels of suspended particulates, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and total oxidants are declining substantially, while the level of total hydrocarbons and nitrogen dioxide are gradually increasing. Without embarking upon a lengthy statistical discussion, it is submitted
that each of the alleged "trends" presented graphically in the AMS tract can also
be explained as the result of random fluctuations in the weather and industrial activity, and by inaccuracy of the measuring instruments.
Because of the extreme difficulty of drawing reliable conclusions from air
sampling data, AMS has attempted to evaluate itself in other ways as well. Among
these ire: number of investigations made; violation notices written; cases prosecuted
in municipal court; office conferences held; tons of pollution prevented; and compliance schedules adopted by major dischargers. Also, the number of citizen complaints provides a useful basis for evaluation. In this regard it is worth noting that
both the District Attorney's office and the Delaware Valley Citizens Council for
Clean Air report a substantial reduction in the number of complaints received regarding specific air pollution nuisances since the Code was adopted. Childs Interview, cupra note 56. Among indices not apparently used by the AMS are amounts
spent by dischargers on control equipment, average time interval between receipt of
citizen complaints and arrival of AMS inspectors, effects data (such as corrosive
effects on steel exposed to air for a given length of time), observations of airline
pilots, and public health data. Other standards of evaluation could, of course, be
devised. The point is that what may at first glance appear to be a simple question
of measurement, in the final analysis turns out to be an elusive search for criteria
upon which one might make a defensible judgment. Evaluation of air pollution control programs can hardly be more precise or less difficult than evaluation of a particular economic policy or a system of education. A greatly expanded and improved
air quality sampling network may eventually make it possible to rely on trends in
sampling observations, but at present this is simply not yet possible.
206. Federal funding for Philadelphia's air pollution control effort increased exponentially during the period 1965-70 and brought increasingly sophisticated federal
scrutiny and federal pressure for effective action. A 1970 federal report contained
91 specific recommendations for increased effectiveness of AMS programs. U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, EVALUATION REPORT FOR AIR MANAGE-
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agency's own judicious use of publicity," 7 should not be discounted,
but, equally, the 1969 Air Management Code must be recognized as
the foundation of success. The Code's strength lies in its clear rejection of the nuisance concept, its broad grant of authority to the Air
Pollution Control Board (requiring that agency to promulgate a
complete set of air management regulations), and its attempt to place
a substantial arsenal of enforcement weapons at the disposal of the
Department of Health's Bureau of Air Management Services. These
aspects of the Code can be recommended to other jurisdictions.
(1970) (copy on file with Victor H.
Sussman, Chairman, Air Pollution Commission, Harrisburg).
207. The "Top 15" theme has been especially effective. See notes 112-126 and
accompanying text supra.
MENT SERVICES IN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
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